McCunn, city judge of said city, and a jurY And on the trial it was proved that two of the prisoners, to wit, Rosanna Quinlan and James Quinlan, are and were, at the time when both were indicted, married to each other; that the counsel for Rosanna Quinlan and James Quiulan asked the court to charge the jury that upon the proof of the marriage, and that the parties were man and wife, both of them could not be convicted The court refused to charge the jury in that way, but charged that, if the husband was present at the time the intent to commit the offense was formed, the law pre- sumes she acted under his compulsion; but, if they find that she formed the intent to commit the crime, and actually commenced its consummation in his absence and without his knowledge, the fact that he afterwards arrived and aided in completing it, did not create the presumption that she acted under his compulsion; that whether the wife, in the present case, acted under the compulsion of her hus- band, was a question for the jury to determine from all the evidence in the case.

To such ruling, and to the refusal of the court to charge the first proposition, the counsel for the prisoner excepted Rosanna Quinlan was found guilty by the jury of grand larceny, and was sentenced by the court to two years imprisonment in the State prison Her counsel then brought the case before this court by writ of errOr I The allegation of stealing "bank bills, of banks to the jurors aforesaid unknown, and of a number and denomination to the jurors aforesaid unknown, of the value of forty-nine dollars," is a proper one.

(Per DENIO, Ch J, People v Hastens, 16 J N Y, 347)II The city judge correctly left to the jury the doctrine of legal coercion or non-coercion, as applied to the par- ticlar participation of the husband and wife in the criminal transaction under triaL 1 Certainly the request of counsel was wrong, because it only approached the legal doctrine, and comprised only some precedent elements.

2 The court charged in words as follows: "if the hus- baiul was present at the time the intent to commit the ollciKse was formed, the law presumes she acted under his compulsion; but, if they find that she formed the intent to commit the crime, and actually commenced its consumma- tion in his absence and without his knowledge, the fact that he afterwards arrived and aided in completing it, did not create the presumption that she acted under his com- pulsion; that whether the wife, in the present case, acted under the compulsion of her husband, was a question for the jury to determine from all the evidence in the case.

" 3 This charge, in efiect, stated the law in the following language of WHARTON: " but if she commit a crime of her own voluntary act, even in company with or by coercion of her husband, she is punishable as much as if she were sole.