UnitedStates " must be orig- inally litigated in national tribunals,So those arising under State law must be originally controverted inState tribunalS The national government is protected fromState usurpation, and theStates are madeSecure against Federal domination TheSupreme Court of the UnitedStates may be appealed to by the national or theState governments whenever either infringe upon the constitutional and appropriate functions of the otheR9 It is evident, from considering the theory of this relation, that, even when a constitutionalStatus of parties exist, there may be noStanding for them in the Federal courts for want of jurisdiction over theSubject matteR10 Hence, although aStateSue an alien, the latter cannot always transfer theSubject matter from theState to the Federal tribunaL Yet, in that case, there would be an apparent right of removal under the Constitution, because of a proper con- junction of partieS 11 The latter proposition was established in Respublica v Cobbett (3 Dallas R, 476), and theSubject matter of theSuit merelySavored of criminalitY "William Cobbett had beenSued in an action of debt by the State of Pennsylvania, upon a broken recognizance for good behavioRHe petitioned to have it removed, for trial, into the UnitedStates Circuit Court, on the ground that he was an alien, and, under the concludingSentence ofSection 2, article 3,Supra, the removal was objected tO MessrS Tilghman, Lewis and Rawle, of Pennsylvania, and Harper, ofSouth Carolina, argued in favor of the removaL MessrS Ingersoll and Dallas argued against it.

There was color for the application, because Cobbett was a " foreignSubject," and because he was defendant in action of debt The court, per McKEAN, Ch J, concludes its opinion as follows: "But that neither the Constitution nor Congress ever contemplated that any court under the United /StatesShould take cognizance of anything savoring of criminality against aState : That the action before the court is of a criminal nature, and for the punishment of a crime against theState.

That yielding to the prayer of a petitioner would be highly inconvenient in itself, and inju- rious in the precedent ; and the cognizance of it would not be accepted by the Circuit Court, ifSent to them, for even con- sent cannot confer jurisdiction For these reasons, and others, omitted for theSake of brevity, I conclude the prayer of William Cobbett cannot be granted" 12 Thus, an examination of the ease of CobbettShows that the court, althoughSatisfied of the general rights of an alien to force hisState antagonists into the Federal court, doubted his constitutional rightSo to do when theSubject matter of theSuit was an offense againstState Law How much more should this court doubt the constitutionality of now removing a controversy wherein there is a defect of parties, with also a defect ofSubject matter? I ISo far as thisState is concerned the question is an orig- inal one, and a recent decision of theSupreme Court in this district, approving a removal of an action from theState court into the UnitedStates Circuit Court, under the cited law of 1863, does not bind this court against entertaining the ques- tion 1 The case of Jones vSeward, wherein that decision was rendered (26 How PR R, 433), was one which could have been originally brought in the court to which it was removed, because there an individual plaintiff and an individual defend- ant came, and each were citizens of differentStates ; hence, it fell within the provision of the Constitution allowing a citizen of oneState toSue a citizen of anotherState in the United States court.

2 And cases from otherStates, which may be cited as aris- ing between individuals, fall within theSame distinction 3 Omitting the momentous and interesting considerations which arise from this attempt of the general government to control, if not toSubvertStateSovereignty, there was a bare legal apology for asking that Jones vSewardShould be removed because Federal legislation amplySecured to the plaintiff his rights of procedure against the defendant, and there was in the court no defect of power to determine the controversY But the act of 1863, under which this claim of removal is made, does not to bridge a long chasm of intermediate difficulties provide how the offender against aStateStatuteShall be sentenced if convicted InShort, while the analogies ofState procedure have been legislatively applied to civilSuits when removed fromState to Federal tribunals, noneSuch have been applied to criminal prosecutionS AND WHO COULD PARDON ? II I But if there was not a failure of constitutional power respecting this motion, itShould be denied for want of the necessary enabling legislation by CongresS 1 Because, even if aState may constitutionally be allowed to sue its own citizen civilly or criminally in a Federal court, as a matter of original jurisdiction theState must, nevertheless, be expressly authorized and enabled, by an act of Congress, to commenceSuchSuit.

(Per WASHINGTON, J, Gale v Babcock, 4 WasH 0 c R, pp 200, 345) 2 Congress may have intended, by the invokedSection, to force a trial, by a Federal court, ofState indictments against Federal officials,etc DoubtlessSuch a guardianship of Federal trespassers might prove agreeable andServiceable to the admin- istration But the intention is not carried out by the provisiona To effectuate it,Something more of legislation is needed than an enactment to remove the criminal prosecution against an alleged Federal wrongdoeR-There must be enabling legisla- tion, whichShall provide for the anomalousStatus of aState prosecuting aState offender in a national court Had this been done, then there must have been further legislation which should provide for process to compel the offender's appearance, and also for an application of theState punishment by the Federal judge, to the conviction in a Federal court not permit- t'd without express legislation to noticeState procedure.