On the other hand, in Kilpatrick v The People (5 Denio R, 277), maliciously breaking two windows in the house of another person, was held not to be a criminal offense.

In the latter caseStress was laid upon the fact that the act complained of was not committedSecretly, nor in the night time, and was not an act of cruelty to a domestic animaL In England, as has been already intimated, the limits of this class of offenses, and their punishment, are defined by numerousStatutes,So that but few, if any, cases can be found which were decided by the common Law TheStatutes of Great Britain make many trespasses criminal offenses, which, without them, would be only wrong- ful nets, to be redressed by damages in a civil actionSo there are variousStatutes with us making certain trespasses punishable criminallY But it is obvious that every trespass is not a criminal offense, although every trespass is in the eye of the law " willful," and even a maliciouS" Judge BEARDSLEY, in Kilpatrick v The People,Says, very justly and pointedly, that malice is an ingredient in every intentional wrong, but that even a malicious intent to do an act of injury, without hope or expectation of profit to the wrongdoer, will not make the act indictable.

It is quite clear, I think, that there is noSuch criminal offense at common law as a " willful trespasS" Every wrongful act to the person, or personal or real property of another, is a willful trespass, and this, as a generic term, will include all crimes to the person, andSome offenses against propertY But the term defines a class of wrongful acts merely, and not of crimeS It is not theSame as " malicious mis- chief," which describes acts criminal at common Law On the contrary, the two classes of wrongs are plainly and broadly distinguishable.

In the clause of theStatute now in question, the phrase, willful trespass, does not, therefore, describe any crime, except asSuch an act is madeSuch byStatute.

There are certain willful trespasses which are indictable and punish- able, and the presentStatute refers to these onlY The context and connection of the words in theStatute are alsoSufficient, to my mind, toShow that the trespasses referred to are acts of trespass upon landS TheStatute confers juris- diction upon Courts ofSpecialSessions to try variousSpecified acts of wrong to persons and property, which are crimes by common law and byStatute, and which would be included within willful trespasses, if that termShould be construed in its ordinary or full legalSense.